Sunday, December 12, 2010

A Model for Credible and Response Security Operations

The focal point for keeping tabs with security and compliance activities has been the Security Operations Center (SOC): a physical location that is the front-line to handle incident reports, review system logs and constantly monitor the environment - 24x7. 

Take the latest Wikileaks extravaganza (details left for another blog post) that pits the security operations of some of the world’s most IT savvy companies (Visa, Mastercard, Paypal and Amazon.com) against relatively un-organized “hactivists”. 

The wall-street journal online gives a picture of what a SOC looks and feels like: “in PayPal's network operation center, charts showing total payments processed per minute and total traffic to the site, along with other data, are projected on a large, curved wall in front of around 20 workstations, each holding three to five computer monitors.” Add security events and blinking lights for threat alerts and you get a SOC.

According to the reports Paypal did not suffer a down-time, neither did Amazon.com. Mastercard and Visa didn’t fair so well. In the article it was speculated that MasterCard and Visa simply did not invest in their security operations to “gird for attacks from a more-sophisticated cyber army”.  

That sort of after-the-fact (lets investigate what happened and then make things better) approach to security operations can be very costly. A survey of 45 organizations by the Ponemon Institute found that on average, cybercrime takes 4 weeks to investigate and each cybercrime averages a cost of $3.8 million/year in financial loss and response and remediation costs.

Security operations also have another omnipresent master: regulatory compliance mandates and legal enforcements. Hundreds of laws are introduced every year at the US state level that affect the collection, use, handling, and disclosure of personal data in one way or another.  These laws may be introduced as “privacy” laws, or may be attached to financial services, health care, employment, children’s services or other laws as well.

And so the conventional model of security operations is too pick and choose from a menu of out of the box technologies and tools with no over-arching strategy or long-tail capabilities road-map. By the latter I mean a lack of investments in niche and customizable applications such as illicit insider threats or dealing with persistent threats. The standard functions that are sourced and acquired either in-house or as a managed service: Infrastructure security, device monitoring and management, Security incident and event management, Security incident response and forensics and Threat research and vulnerability management. 

If we are not getting any safer and compliance is unabated – is doing the same thing over and over again not insanity? The thought is a new working model that helps guide an organization towards a better-quality operational picture that is more responsive, rather than reactive. I am not suggesting new technology or standards. Instead a framework to orient the enterprise in sourcing, acquiring and deploying the arsenal.

The model starts with an abstract layer of requirements to help evaluate the maturity of an organization. Not unlike some common principles (integration, automation, service oriented architectures) that would apply to CRM, ERP, or SCM – a domain that is being re-framed by cloud computing.

Here are some of the competencies or master specifications that could apply to “next generation” security operations:

Process Automated Responses
  • Operator activity should be automated processes that accommodate human-in-the-loop work-flows for decision making that can be optimized. The aspiration here is processes that shuttle information to policy makers, engineers, the C-Suite and application developers. If data encryption is ramping up then security operations would be prepared to deal with the ramifications of additional reporting. An anti-virus clean-up task would trigger notifications to engineers and analysts spell out countermeasures
  • Strategic plans and courses-of-actions would govern pre-and post incidents and designed to avoid disruption to the mission or business. Basically some sort of “rules engine” that makes the system hum. EINSTEIN 3 is a system that will be deployed by US government agencies that “will have the ability to automatically detect and respond appropriately to cyber threats before harm is done, providing an intrusion-prevention system supporting dynamic defense”.
Enablement of Virtual Resources
  • Ability to rapidly source high powered computing resources, to process sudden or unplanned volumes of traffic as well as test countermeasures. For example, a bandwidth-based attack like a Denial-of-service would be met with defense that shield parts of the network from collateral damage. The current trend is also to break apart malware and study it for intent, origin and then design of countermeasures. There are vendors that offer tools to simulate the behavior of malware in a safe and condoned test-bed environments. Support for integration and interoperability is key.
  • Private and public partnerships are used to to analyze indicators of attacks and early into the planning phases of the adversary. Imagine, if you will, the National Security Agency (in the US) working with private firms to alert them of possible cyber strikes.  A slippery slope of government intervention. Google is working with NSA to help sort through the Chinese hack of its computers.
  • A virtual team of experts and analysts will make-up the diverse mix of users and consumers. Decades of research and technology in IT security has shown us that absolute security is a fallacy. Now its also clear that we have not invested in nurturing the right crop of professionals. A recent study by the Center for Strategic and International Studies nails home the point for the US, that we simply don’t have the talent to stay steps ahead. So outside collaboration and the means to do so will be critical.
Analytics-Driven Security
  • We know that fusion of all sorts of data is pivotal to create higher-fidelity alerts of intruders, and spot subtle yet suspicious activity. The idea is to monitor ingress and egress points and pull data from human resources, firewall logs and even law enforcement. Trouble is that today’s intrusion detection systems are short-sighted and often blind-sided. The US government’s EINSTIEN 2 system that is meant to up the ante and is installed at all connections between government computer systems and the public Internet. The system gathers and sketches out threat signatures from foreign intelligence and DoD information assurance missions
  • Absorbing and monitoring Internet traffic; human, software and computer activity is one thing and then trying to make sense of it all is quite another. The mathematics behind statistical analysis and analogue techniques in data mining offer powerful aids to understand past and present events. Forecasting models can be used to project probability of whether a threat scenario will come to pass.
  • Privacy-enhancing mechanisms will be needed to limit the collection and retention of personally identifiable information. When speaking about any surveillance recommendations the temptation will be to over-reach authority and the risk of privacy violation is all too real. Basically the principle here should be to redact or obfuscate sensitive content that is not pertinent to down-stream threat analysis or won’t help the advancement of compliance.
Do these above themes make sense? Send me a note at walid.negm@acecnture.com. I’d like to hear your thoughts on whether the above above themes are relevant to CIOs, CTOs, CISOs and business executives struggling to get their heads around where to prioritize their security investments.

Wednesday, December 8, 2010

Dumbstruck - Wikileaks, law, cyberware and politics (regulary updated)

Wikileaks as of 12/9/2010 has yet to be convicted of any crime by the US government.
Most reasonable folk can agree that the unauthorized release (leak) of sensitive information should be handled with care. The trouble is most folk are neither sensible, nor in agreement about what sensitive information is.
And the story continues to unfold...

Update on Legal Position
12/09/2010: "The U.S. government indicated 12/09/2010 that WikiLeaks spokesman Julian Assange could be in legal jeopardy for disclosing classified information because he is "not a journalist." When asked whether "traditional media" organizations that republish secret documents could be prosecuted, State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley said that the administration applauds "the role of journalists in your daily pursuits." "In our view, Mr. Assange is not a journalist," Crowley added". Source here.

12/10/2010: "Wikileaks founder Julian Assange, the man behind the publication of more than a 250,000 classified U.S. diplomatic cables, could soon be facing spying charges in the U.S. related to the Espionage Act, Assange's lawyer said today" Source: here

12/13/2010: The World War I Espionage Law criminalizes anyyone who possesses or transmits any "information relating to the national defense" which an individual has "reason to believe could be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation." The Espionage Act was not written to distinguish the leaker or the spy and the recipient. 

Streaming Reactions
The US government is rightfully so more than livid and is exploring the options. A slew of companies have pulled the plug on the Wikileaks organization from Visa, Mastercard, PayPal, EveryDNS.

Here is Amazon Web Services getting an earful from some of their customers for pulling the plug.


A new Wikileaks kid on the block is on tap reported by the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter reported today. The new project: Openleaks is said to be online any time now. "The two organizations are similar in that aspect that both are focusing on providing means for whistleblowers to anonymously provide the public with information,” as stated by an insider.

The Politics: 
Varying positions continue to be voiced. One side of the debate foxnews and the other side... the atlantic

The Attacks and Counter Attacks
12/8/2010: Lets get this party started
Wikileaks plays it cool and diversifies -- real quick --spreading its documents on mirror sites, adding redundancy to "caller-id" DNS look-ups and a variety of things so it can take a licking and keep on ticking.

And things all of a sudden start to escalate into extremist and rash retaliation  Reuters: "More cyber attacks in retaliation for attempts to block the WikiLeaks website are likely in a "data war" to protect Internet freedom, a representative of one of the groups involved said Thursday"

12/9/2010: Operation Payback in the news.
"A collective of hackers who have set their sights on those companies that have denied service to WikiLeaks and its founder are now trying to take down Amazon.com. They announced via Twitter that they would begin their attack at 11 a.m. ET". Source: http://mashable.com/2010/12/09/operation-payback-amazo/

Espionage act 'Makes Felons of Us All' - legal experts

Quotes 
"To me, New York Times has committed at least an act of bad citizenship, and whether they've committed a crime, I think that bears very intensive inquiry by the Justice Department," IS Senator Joe Lieberman


"In a time of universal deceit, telling the truth becomes a revolutionary act." -1984, George Orwell 

I think in today's climate, telling the truth is classified as "terrorism"
 
"In our view, Mr. Assange is not a journalist" State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley


"Leaks of classified information to the press have only rarely been punished as crimes, and we are aware of no case in which a publisher of information obtained through unauthorized disclosure by a government employee has been prosecuted for publishing it," - Jennifer Elsea, a legal researcher for the US Congress

Techie Section
Its just like a video game: Operation Payback is asking its followers to download a piece of software called LOIC to fire off a distributed denial of service attack at targets. The question of course is “what IF I get caught”. Here is a snipped from from one of their FAQ’s. By the way V& stands for Van’d – as in when the FBI shows up at your house in Van:
  • You probably won't. It's recommended that attack with over 9000 other anons while attacking alone pretty much means doing nothing. If you are a complete idio and LOIC a small server alone, there is a chance of getting V&. No one will bother let alone have the resources to deal with DDoS attacks that happens every minute around the world. Then theres always the botnet excuse. Just say your pc was infected by a botnet and you have since ran antivirus programs and what not to try to get rid of it. Or just say you have NFI what a DDoS is at all.